This case interpreted the definition of a convention refugee in section 2 of the Canadian Immigration Act. Particularly on what counts as persecution and the 2 grounds of persecution (particular social group, political opinion) and the exception on dual nationality. 

The court held that “convention refugee” did not contemplate state complicity in the persecution of a claimant. A state’s inability to protect its citizens from persecution is sufficient. Further, “convention refugee” does not encompass a claimant’s “unwillingness” or “inability” to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. 

The court set out the criteria for establishing membership to “particular social groups”. The court identified 3  categories: groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence. INLA did not fall in any of the three categories. 

The court held that the appellant was persecuted by the INLA because of his political opinion, specifically his belief that the killing of innocent hostages was an unacceptable means of achieving political change. This was manifested when the appellant facilitated the hostages’ escape. 

For refugee claimants with dual nationality, the court should establish the inability of each State to protect them from persecution. The court held that the appellant’s claim to convention refugee status was not excluded on this ground. The appellant was a citizen of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Board, therefore, erred in finding insufficient evidence for dual nationality. The court found that the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 allowed the British government to deny entry to a national who was involved in the commission of terrorism connected with Northern Ireland.